Financial independence for the National Prosecuting Authority will be inadequate and possibly irrelevant to independence and the prosecution of corruption, without more leeway to hire outside counsel in high-level corruption cases.
 

Author: 

J Redpath

Summary: 

This article reviews the literature on the effects of prosecutorial independence on public-sector corruption. In terms of the literature, de facto independence of prosecution agencies robustly reduces corruption of officials. Further cross-country literature on what makes prosecutors independent, finds only three major correlates: (1) common law as legal origin, (2) a free press, and (3) regulations granting Parliamentarians immunity from prosecution. The article goes on to consider the implications of these findings for the South African context. The evidence strongly suggests that the national legislation in South Africa has failed to ensure that the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) operates without fear, favour or prejudice. Reform is required. Moreover, the literature suggests that financial independence of the NPA will be inadequate to and possibly irrelevant to combatting corruption if the setting of salaries and hiring of outside counsel remains ad hoc and effectively in the control of the Minster. Furthermore, if the President alone continues to appoint the top 14 posts in the NPA, with only the National Director of Public Prosecutors (NDPP) on a limited term of 10 years, stagnation in the NPA will continue. The limiting and staggering of terms of the Director of Public Prosecutors (DPPs) is crucial to ensuring not only independence, but quality and dynamism. Transparency requirements should also be legislated to strengthen the role of the press.

Link to report